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Abstract 
 
Long-term supply contracts often have ambiguous effects on the competitive structure, investment and consumer 
welfare in the long term. In a context of market building, these effects are likely to be worsened and thus even harder 
to assess. Since liberalization and especially since the release of the Energy Sector Enquiry in early 2007, the 
portfolio of long-term supply contracts of the former incumbents have become a priority for review by the European 
Commission and the national competition authorities. It is widely believed that European Competition authorities 
take a dogmatic view on these contracts and systemically emphasize the risk of foreclosure over their positive effects 
on investment and operation. This paper depicts the methodology that has emerged in the recent line of cases and 
argues that this interpretation is largely misguided. It shows that a multiple-step approach is used to reduce regulation 
costs and balance anti-competitive effects with potential efficiency gains. However, if an economic approach is now 
clearly implemented, competition policy is constrained by the procedural aspect of the legal process and the remedies 
imposed remain open for discussion.   
 
Index Terms — Long-term Contract, Competition Policy, European Union 
 
JEL Classification —  K21; L42; L44 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-term supply contracts (LTC) remain a pervasive feature of most European energy markets despite 
the progress of liberalization (DG COMP, 2007). To get out of the monopoly era, the current refining and 
harmonization of European market designs may be pointless if incumbents continue to use these contracts 
as market control devices (Neuman and Hirschausen, 2006; Glachant and Lévêque, 2006). Indeed, these 
contracts frequently have anti-competitive foreclosure effects when competition is imperfect (Rasmussen et 
al., 1991; Segal and Whinston, 2000; Fumagalli and Motta, 2006) and these effects are likely to be 
worsened in a market building context. However, there is growing acceptance that their positive impact on 
investment makes them desirable as long as spot market competition remains unsatisfactory (Chao et al., 
2008; Finon and Roques, 2008). Welfare-enhancing aspects must thus be weighted against possible side 
effects on the current market building efforts of the European Union (EU).  
Today, the allocation of regulatory powers in the EU is biased in favor of the ex post enforcement of EC 
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antitrust law. The institutional structure of the European Union does not give to the European Commission 
the power to ex ante alter property rights in the different member states and thus to carry an aggressive 
policy of horizontal de-integration which would probably deliver better and faster results (Green and 
Newbery, 1997; Newbery et al., 2003). In addition, the lack of an EU-wide energy regulator with effective 
power to monitor and regulate market developments ex ante, especially cross-border trade issues, is 
particularly detrimental to the integration and the well-functioning of European energy markets (Glachant 
and Lévêque, 2006). While the ex ante part of energy regulation shows obvious signs of weakness, the 
European commission has announced it would use its antitrust power with even more strength in the 
coming years (Monti, 2003; DG COMP 2007).  
Conducting market building through antitrust does not go without uncertainties about the suitability of 
the policy tool itself and about the ability of the judges to enforce it. Antitrust policy remains constrained 
by the legal process, and especially judicial review. This also raises questions both about the discretion 
which a process of market building requires to be conducted efficiently and about the time and cost of 
dispute resolution through court trial (Newbery, 2005). In addition, antitrust is usually enforced in sectors 
where competition is more mature and a limited knowledge of competition dynamics may result in 
significant error costs (Smeers, 2005). 
Following a worldwide trend in global antitrust (Van den Bergh, 2002), the on-going modernization of 
EC antitrust policy aims at implementing a ‘more economic’ approach based on long-term consumer 
welfare. It means gradually shifting from a legal ‘form-based’ analysis of contracts to a more ‘effect-based’ 
approach where the real economic effects of competitive behaviors are more important than the drafting of 
contracts (Ehlerman, 2000; Wesseling, 2000; Verouden, 2003; Bishop and Ridyard, 2002; EAGCP, 2005). 
The ‘more-economic’ approach might significantly impact the way EC antitrust laws are enforced, which 
brings new uncertainties both for the regulators and the regulated firms. 
If EC antitrust policy becomes the main energy policy tool to open markets at the EU level, it is worth 
analyzing the forces which shape its implementation. The case of LTC is particularly interesting as they 
have become one of the main priorities for antitrust enforcement (DG COMP, 2007). A series of cases has 
already come out and new ones are regularly opened, for instance lately against EDF and Electrabel. A 
widespread view, both in academia and in the industry, is that the European Commission is taking a 
dogmatic view on LTC and would simply consider them unacceptable when implemented by dominant 
companies. This can be understood as DG Competition since the early 2000’s has publicly and repeatedly 
voiced strong concerns over the risks of anti-competitive effects inherent in energy LTC (Albers, 2001; DG 
COMP, 2007). However, a more economic approach in antitrust could not reject outright LTC in energy 
and should command a more-balanced approach.  
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The objective of this paper is two-fold. The first one is to depict the pros and cons of LTC in energy, 
from the usual IO and NIE perspectives (e.g. Neuhoff and Hirschaussen, 2006), which are the perspectives 
of individual contracting parties, as well as from a general antitrust point of view. The second one is to 
analyze the actual behavior of the European Commission vis-à-vis these contracts and the methodology it is 
implementing to analyze foreclosure in the existing context.  
The paper will be divided as follows. Section II will present what economics has to say on the current EU 
antitrust dilemma with LTC in energy and what are its limitations. Section III will depict the two-step 
methodology that is emerging at the European Commission to analyze the anti-competitive effects of 
energy LTC. Section IV will then turn to the difficulties which the European Commission has to balance 
the anti-competitive effects and the potential efficiency gains. It will also analyze the remedies imposed to 
correct the anti-competitive features of European energy markets and the ‘pro-entry’ bias that can be 
depicted. Concluding remarks will follow. 
 
II. THE EU ACTUAL ANTITRUST DILEMMA WITH LTC IN ENERGY: FORECLOSURE VS TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
In essence, antitrust policy is about maximizing long term social welfare, with a general bias in favor of 
consumer welfare in the EU. This often implies constraining the freedom of some economic agents in the 
short term to reach a greater social value over several periods of times. It is typically the case with the 
deregulation of energy markets where incumbents must suffer some harm to facilitate the coming up of 
truly competitive markets, deemed to increase social welfare (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; Markiewicz and 
Wolfram, 2004). The balancing between the efficiency gains of long-term contracting for a few individual 
market players and the potential negative effects on social welfare are at the hearth of the antitrust dilemma 
with LTC in energy. However, restricting the freedom to contract of some agents must be based on valid 
economic reasoning and requires being able to conduct some kind of inter-temporal analysis of LTC effects 
on welfare. We present in this section a basic economic analysis of the pros and cons of LTC for individual 
market players and for the society as a whole.    
 
A- LTC decrease transaction costs for contracting parties 
 
LTC are often considered an efficient substitute for vertical integration in case merger is prohibited or 
considered to incur too heavy organizational costs. The main advantage of LTC for individual firms is to 
hedge price and quantity risks and therefore facilitate investment or operation. In the old monopoly era, 
vertical integration and long-term contracting were the preferred way to structure business relationships in 
 
 
 4
energy. Reliability and investment were ensured, but at a hidden cost for society (Stern, 2004; Litlleshild, 
2005). In the new competitive paradigm, large and stable spot markets are to coordinate behaviors and 
should be liquid enough to enable firms to sink high fixed costs investments based on reliable investment 
signals. Yet, European spot markets remain under-developed (DG Comp, 2007), demand is inelastic and 
market structures are highly concentrated, hence firms tend to resort to more durable vertical arrangements. 
If spot markets are under-developed, future cash flows are uncertain and the uncertainty on the returns will 
lead risk-adverse investors to under-invest in generation capacities (Neuhoff and de Vries, 2004). LTC may 
mitigate this by providing an insurance device which will also help secure funds with investment banks 
under project financing structures (Lacy, 2006; Finon and Roques, 2008). From a theoretical point of view, 
Neuhoff and Hirschausen (2006) show that market players may have strategic incentives to favor LTC 
when long-term elasticity of demand is higher than short-term elasticity. However, it is not clear that short 
term cash management rationale should extend to pure long-term hedging strategies not linked to any new 
investment in capacity. Indeed, long-term hedging in this case would severely limit profit opportunities 
(Parsons, 2008). 
If bilateral contracting is unavoidable due to the state of spot market development, LTC will help 
economize on the transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985) linked to the uncertainty described above and 
the significant asset specific investments of energy markets. LTC help solve the problem of counterparty 
credibility and thus increase the total surplus to be shared (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1983). The 
different players face different price and quantity risk depending on their position on the supply chain and 
the technology used. LTC then enable them to allocate that risk on the party best able to manage it (Wiser 
et al., 2004; Finon and Roques, 2008). The pricing scheme should thus mirror the risk aversion profiles of 
the parties and risk premiums will depend not only on the counterparty’s characteristics and risk aversions 
but also on diverse political, regulatory and macroeconomic risks (Glachant and Hallack 2008). Empirical 
research supports the theory and shows for instance that gas supply contracts linked to an asset specific 
investment are on average four years longer (Neuman and Hirschausen, 2006). Similar relationships 
between transaction costs and the length of contracts had already been demonstrated by Joskow (1985, 
1987a, 1987b) in the case of coal contracts. In the opposite direction, as soon as asset specificity decreases, 
efficiency gains attached to LTC decrease as well (Parsons, 1989; Doane and Spulber, 1994). This 
probably explains why where liberalization has been implemented contract length naturally tend to 
decrease (Neuman and Hirschausen, 2005; Stern, 1998).  
It is important to note that LTC are not monolithic and display different results in terms of surplus and 
risk management depending on contract characteristics and the technology involved (Wiser et al., 2004). 
The inclusion of tacit renewal clauses for instance decreases the transaction costs of renegotiation (EDF-
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IDEI Report, 2006). Reduction clauses allow the buyer to reduce off-take in case the supplier starts 
reselling in its commercial area, which protects the buyer’s market and its sunk investments. Volume 
clauses may include rebate mechanisms which may reduce the price for the buyer. Exclusivity clauses also 
enable the buyer to decrease transaction costs. Indeed, Crocker and Masten (1988) and Masten and Crocker 
(1985) show that the take-or-pay clauses provide enough flexibility to avoid breach and thus expensive 
renegotiation of contracts. The LTC will thus be the most efficient governance structure for contracting 
parties if it ensures flexibility for renegotiation and solves the counterparty credibility problem (Borison 
and Hamm, 2005). In return, LTC will not be efficient for individual market players in any case, especially 
if the economic agent has a certain monopoly or monopsony power and could manipulate spot prices.  
 
B- Efficiency for individual market players rejoins efficiency for the society in some cases 
 
As a result, some positive effects of energy LTC on social welfare may clearly be depicted. In the short 
term, LTC tend to limit double marginalization (Onofri, 2005) and may prevent abuse of dominance on 
spot markets, although this is a highly debated argument. The strategic behavior of firms on spot and 
forward markets has been the main stream of research in the economics of energy LTC since the seminal 
contribution of Allaz and Vila (1993). The policy recommendations are not unanimous though. Due to the 
high concentration levels of supply and demand and the low demand elasticity, at least in the short term, 
abuses of market power on spot markets through withholding of capacities are likely. LTC may limit the 
incentives of dominant operators to abuse their market power on the spot as increases in prices would only 
be profitable on the un-contracted part of their supplies, hence LTC tend to increase traded volumes, 
especially when supplier concentration is low (Green 1999; Bushnell, 2007; Willem and de Corte, 2008). 
This is however true only if competition is modeled à la Cournot, especially if coupled with other measures 
to increase demand elasticity (Borenstein, 2002). If competition is modeled à la Bertrand, results go in the 
opposite direction (Mahenc and Salanié, 2004). From a theoretical point of view, Bonasina et al. (2007) 
and Smeers (2005) show that the set of assumptions used in the diverse models are too uncertain to firmly 
ground policy actions. From a practical point of view, it will indeed be difficult for antitrust authorities to 
differentiate between the exercise of market power and legitimate scarcity rents (Fraser, 2003). It is also 
likely that the standard of proof used in courts would in any way be too high to use that argument. 
Positive effects of LTC on social welfare are much more obvious in the longer term. First, LTC facilitate 
entry and thus contribute to market building if spot prices are volatile, when they are sufficiently long and 
when they can cover sufficiently high volumes (Green and Newbery, 1993, Green and Newbery; 1997, 
Newbery, 1998). The second positive effect is not only that it facilitates investment and thus contribute to 
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long-term generation adequacy, it is also that it may contribute to fuel mix diversity by facilitating 
investments in base load technologies such as nuclear or coal (Finon and Perez, 2008). Indeed, the greater 
the fixed costs are, the greater are price and quantity risks (Roques et al., 2005; Finon and Roques, 2008). 
Whereas large, diversified and vertically-integrated incumbents can implement portfolio strategies and 
obtain a relatively greater value from base-load technologies (Roques et al., 2006; Roques et al., 2007), 
unstable spot markets constitute an especially high barrier to entry for new players in these technologies. 
Roques (2007) indeed shows that without LTC, CCGT is the preferred technology for new entrants as it is 
self-hedged given the correlation between electricity and gas prices observed in most markets. This makes 
CCGT particularly attractive to new entrants, which is confirmed by Watson (2004). LTC might thus 
enable new entrants to invest directly in high-fixed cost technologies. This would also reduce their 
incentives to swap peak against base load capacities owned by incumbents, rather than investing, in order 
to reach a more balanced portfolio of technologies. A recent example of this was the agreement between 
EDF and POWEO signed in January 2007. POWEO indeed gained access to EDF nuclear capacities from 
2007 to 2021 and will give in return a future access to its CCGT currently in the construction phase, for the 
same capacity and the same period (160 MW per year over 15 years). 
C- But LTC can trap European energy markets in a vicious circle reinforcing collective dominance of 
incumbents 
 
LTC have both positive and negative effects from the point of view of long-term social welfare. The 
main problem with LTC is the risk of foreclosure of more efficient players. This problem is even stronger 
in a context of market building and is the main argument of the European Commission and national 
competition authorities to attack these contracts (DG COMP, 2007). If a significant part of demand is tied 
in the long run, a lack of retail outlets may lead to significant output foreclosure at the production level and 
tied consumers will not be able to subsequently benefit from future and potentially more profitable offers 
by new entrants. LTC may thus constitute a barrier to entry and have a negative effect on third parties. 
Conversely, if the market structure at the producer level is very concentrated, input foreclosure may occur 
and prevent entry in retail. For the Chicago School, an inefficient attempt to monopolize the market is 
impossible as it would require the acceptation of the buyer to incur the loss of not dealing with a more 
efficient entrant (Bork, 1978; Posner, 1976). This holds only under perfect information and if all possible 
parties are able to negotiate at the contracting stage. Under perfect information about the likelihood of entry 
of a more efficient supplier, economic theory shows that the current supplier is able to propose a contract 
with both a price and a penalty for default clause strictly advantageous for him but neutral or positive for 
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the buyer. Rent would thus jointly be extracted by the incumbent and the buyer from the potential entrant 
but this would not impact social welfare. Therefore, under complete information, LTC could not be 
motivated by anti-competitive motives and would never be detrimental to welfare. An alternative 
explanation introduces buyer-to-buyer externalities while keeping the rationality hypothesis of the Chicago 
school. A buyer might agree to sign an inefficient LTC in order to reduce the size of a potential entrant’s 
market, thereby reducing the probability of entry. As a result, other buyers will have to accept a higher 
price in the next period (Aghion and Bolton, 1987), which will give a competitive hedge to the first buyer. 
While it is rational to sign a LTC for a buyer in that case, buyer-to-buyer externalities render it negative for 
social welfare. Rasmussen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) introduce scale economies in 
production and multiple buyers to show that if an incumbent is able to secure a profit superior to the 
amount required to compensate the buyer from being tied, he will use LTC to fully foreclose the market. In 
case of competition between retailers, Fumagalli and Motta (2006) refined the analyses and showed that the 
risk of exclusion increases when the intensity of downstream competition increases. Simpson and 
Wickelgren (2007) however argue that the opposite is true when buyers are allowed to breach exclusive 
contracts and pay expectation damages.      
LTC also indirectly have exclusionary effects by drying out spot markets. Spot markets deliver better 
results than bilateral contracting only if sufficiently liquid. The absence of competitive spot markets is 
detrimental to social welfare in several ways. A competitive spot market allows more transparency than 
bilateral contracting on the evolution of supply and demand and current production costs of the firms in 
place. The possibility to contract efficiently on the spot also limits the opportunity of dominant agents to 
abuse their market power when they contract bilaterally with smaller players. It mitigates as well the risk 
that in the long term LTC will lead to tacit collusion on spot markets by stabilizing the market shares of an 
oligopoly of collectively dominant suppliers (DG Comp, 2007; Neuman and Hirschausen, 2006; Le Coq, 
2004, Liski and Montero, 2004). However, Green and Le Coq (2006) suggest that the longer LTC are, the 
lesser is the risk that these LTC will lead to tacit collusion. The lack of a liquid spot market will not 
facilitate entry in retail and trading, and will thus foster volatility which encourages market players towards 
vertical re-integration or long-term contracting. Last, we note that similar exclusionary effects may also 
arise both from the fidelity rebates granted by dominant firms and from unclear termination rights, which 
provokes foreclosure effects and higher switching costs, thereby contradicting the current market building 
efforts of the EU. 
Some contract clauses other than duration and exclusivity might also result in anti-competitive effects or 
express an attempt at monopolizing the market. Destination clauses and use restrictions hamper the 
integration of a single European market for energy, facilitate collusion between sellers and decrease 
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competition intensity in the downstream market (Neuhoff and Hirschausen, 2006). Reduction clauses, the 
so-called ‘English clauses’, clauses of ‘right of first refusal’ or ‘most favored customer’ all have similar 
market partitioning effects. Clauses of tacit renewal which typically decrease transaction costs for 
individual contracting parties may easily have lock-in and thus foreclosure effects when the producer is 
overwhelmingly dominant.  
At last, we note that, although not linked directly to the duration or exclusivity clauses, LTC might also 
entail severe price restraints such as excessive pricing or price discrimination. The price negotiated in a 
LTC depends on contracting parties’ information about market conditions as well as on their respective 
bargaining power. As a result, an incumbent might well abuse the position of dependency of a new entrant 
or unfairly discriminate in favor of another incumbent. For instance, in case of regulated tariff in the 
downstream market associated with an overwhelmingly dominant producer upstream, a significant price 
squeeze may lead to severe barrier to entry. To the opposite, price discount linked to a long duration or a 
significant volume may distort competition in the downstream market if this rebate gives a competitive 
hedge to the downstream dominant firm.  
D- Conclusion: the EU actual antitrust dilemma with LTC in energy - quo vadis European Commission? 
 
This section has showed that the antitrust dilemma with LTC in energy is far from entirely solved by 
economic theory. LTC effects on welfare depend on a quantity of variables such as the different risks 
involved, the evolution of supply and demand, the storability of the product, market structure and primarily 
who is signing the contract. Economics does not provide any integrated model to weigh anti-competitive 
effects with potential efficiency gains over several periods of time but clearly shows the different elements 
to be taken into account to conduct the balancing exercise. The above analysis seems to indicate that 
building markets to increase welfare in deregulated energy markets might require an asymmetric 
application of antitrust policy, at least in the short term. Indeed, if a new entry may clearly depend on the 
signing of a LTC, the claim that potential efficiency gains counter-balance anti-competitive effects is much 
less clear in the case of super-dominant incumbents which have already secured a wide customer base, 
even for investments in very high fixed-costs technologies such as nuclear.  
A ‘legalistic’ analysis of LTC, especially if a pro-entry bias is favored, could lead to an analysis 
primarily based on the form of contracts and therefore to a general ban on LTC in energy. A more 
economic approach in the opposite could not rule out the fact that even dominant firms benefit from using 
LTC and that substantial foreclosure effects may not occur in every case. However, fully analyzing the pros 
and cons of all LTC would result in significant enforcement costs. The quality and efficiency of antitrust 
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analysis largely depends on the level of information required to limit ‘type I’ and ‘type II’ errors in 
decision making. As a result, a constant preoccupation of antitrust policy should be to narrow down the 
number of cases where a full competition analysis is required to reach a decision. From that angle, the 
‘legalistic’ approach would have the obvious advantage to clarify rules, both for enforcers and market 
players, and hence to facilitate self-enforcement through deterrence.  
It is widely believed that the European Commission is taking a dogmatic approach on LTC and would 
simply consider them unacceptable when implemented by dominant companies. This can be understood as 
DG Competition since the early 2000’s has publicly and repeatedly voiced strong concerns over the risks of 
anti-competitive effects inherent in energy LTC (Albers, 2001; DG COMP, 2007) without clearly 
acknowledging their positive aspects. However, we will argue in the next two sections that if some 
uncertainty remains, a certain methodology of analysis has emerged at the European Commission and that 
this methodology takes into account most of the modern competition economics of LTC.  
III. A TWO-STEP METHODOLOGY TO ANALYZE THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF LTC IN DEREGULATED 
ENERGY MARKETS IS EMERGING 
 
Prior to liberalization, LTC were not a priority of the European Commission which rather focused on 
removing legal monopolies over imports and exports. A few decisions in the early to mid 1990’s 
nonetheless concerned long-term power purchase agreements between independent power producers and 
the national incumbents. They mainly aimed at limiting their durations so that these LTC would not 
jeopardize the forthcoming opening of markets. 15 years became the canonical duration accepted by 
competition authorities and no structured analysis of foreclosure effects was conducted. Since then, no 
clear methodology to analyze foreclosure effects in the context of deregulated energy markets has been 
clearly communicated by competition authorities and this is why legal uncertainty is so strong currently in 
the market place (Hauteclocque, 2008). However, since the early 2000’s and especially for the last two 
years, a series of decisions have been taken concerning the portfolio of LTC of several incumbents (Repsol, 
E.ON Rurhgas, RWE and most importantly Distrigaz) and new proceedings are regularly opened (EDF, 
Electrabel, GDF). We argue that a two-step methodology to analyze foreclosure of access to customers in 
the new liberalized context is emerging from recent decisions and that this methodology is clearly inspired 
by sound economic principles.    
A- Step one: market share thresholds and black-listed contract clauses – per se prohibitions 
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Antitrust enforcement is constrained by the rules contained in the EC Treaty as firms may appeal against 
the decisions of the European Commission before Community Courts. Art 81 EC which deals with anti-
competitive practices and Art 82 EC which tackles abuses of dominance, together with relevant guidelines, 
notices and regulation, do not a priori allow or ban LTC. They provide to the opposite a framework of 
analysis based on market share thresholds which define which situations must be fully investigated. This 
system is designed to provide predictability to the firms and allow competition authorities to focus their 
enforcement resources to the most serious infringements. It is thus based on the fundamental insight that 
vertical restrictions of competition may be harmful to competition only when horizontal competition is 
distorted. This means that the European Commission will act only when the LTC is implemented by a 
company with market power, market shares being used to approximate the level of dominance. This is an 
imperfect proxy for market power in many cases in energy but as concerns customer foreclosure, market 
shares seem a good and easy tool to use.    
In practice, LTC between small and medium-sized companies are normally not considered by the 
European Commission as being capable of affecting appreciably trade between Member States, except 
when they engage in cross-border trade. In fact, as long as the market shares of each contracting parties do 
not exceed 15%, LTC do not fall under Commission jurisdictions. Beyond 15% market shares, LTC are 
presumed to be legal so long as the market share threshold of 30% is not exceeded and duration is not 
indefinite or over 5 years. In case of collective dominance by several suppliers below the 30% threshold, 
the European Commission or a national competition authority retains the right to conduct a full competition 
analysis. LTC for companies with larger market shares will require a full competition analysis in all cases. 
To the system of market share thresholds has been added a list of black listed clauses, called ‘hard-core’ 
restraints. These contract clauses are thought to contravene the fundamental Treaty objective of market 
integration and hence will almost never be accepted, which amounts to a quasi per se prohibition. Black 
listed clauses relevant for energy are essentially market partitioning clauses, use restrictions and contractual 
provisions having similar effects. Forbidding market partitioning clauses and use restrictions makes sense 
for a homogenous product and in an industry that has traditionally been organized along national borders. 
During the course of recent decisions in energy, the European Commission has also made clear that clauses 
other than duration and exclusivity leading to significant switching costs would almost never be accepted 
when implemented by dominant firms. Among them, unclear termination rights, fidelity rebates and tacit 
renewal clauses have been considered illegal in several decisions. In these instances, the Commission has 
clearly favored the fight against foreclosure over the saving of transaction costs for individual contracting 
parties, even to the detriment of the non-dominant firms contracting with a dominant incumbent.  
The EU law framework to analyze anti-competitive effects of LTC is thus primarily based on market 
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share thresholds and on a series of black listed clauses. Even if these thresholds are set somewhat 
arbitrarily and have not been designed specifically for energy markets, they nevertheless contribute to 
ensure more predictability in enforcement. In addition, they rely on the fact that a firm with low market 
shares will not be able to distort competition sufficiently enough to justify a full competition analysis, 
which is justified from an economic point of view. As concerns the black listed clauses, it is obvious that 
the market integration objective played a big part in their definition. They however fit well in energy where 
the low level of market integration remains hard to overcome. Over 30% and provided that certain clauses 
are not included in the contract, competition authorities see a ‘grey’ area where the assessment of anti-
competitive effects becomes more complicated and where, in theory, a multiplicity of elements should be 
taken into account. We will show that the emerging methodology of the European Commission evidences 
awareness of a lot of the modern economics of foreclosure.    
 
B- Step 2: analysis of anti-competitive effects in ‘grey’ cases – the relevant facts  
 
In case the LTC does not include any hard-core restraints and the market shares of at least one of the 
contracting parties exceed the 30% threshold, the European Commission will conduct a full competition 
analysis of the anti-competitive effects of the agreement to decide if it infringes EC antitrust law. This de 
facto limits antitrust enforcement in energy to the cases involving dominant incumbents. We will see in 
Section III that this is only if there is a strong presumption that the LTC will result in substantial anti-
competitive effects that the analysis of potential efficiency gains attached to the LTC will be carried out 
and that a balancing exercised will be conducted. Long-term contracting by dominant firms is therefore far 
from being illegal per se. 
Competition authorities will consider a lot of different elements to analyze anti-competitive effects. 
Some are purely intrinsic to the vertical relationship as the duration or the volume specified while others 
help to analyze the market context, such as the level of vertical integration in the industry. This is 
reasonable in so far as the potential anti-competitive effects of a LTC, or a portfolio of LTC, cannot be 
understood without taking into account the specificities of the market context. We will thus first analyze 
how the European Commission assesses market characteristics before going on to its analyses of the 
contract itself. 
 
B-1 Analysis of market characteristics 
 
Market characteristics are usually what competition authorities analyze first. Economic theory is poor on 
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insights regarding the patterns of entry in energy markets and the specific market features which favor it. In 
the recent line of decisions, elements taken into account included the maturity of demand, the level of 
vertical integration in the market, the real opportunity to set up a new resale network and the existence of 
buyer power. The latter is important as contracting parties frequently have diverging interests and thus 
incentives to contain each other’s market power. In general, the European Commission considered that the 
presence of numerous buyers de facto limits the possibilities of abuse of a dominant position by the 
supplier. When assessing market characteristics, the European Commission also looks at potential entry in 
supply and demand, and its potential impact on future competition. This largely depended on the existence 
of potential competitors, usually foreign incumbents present in neighboring markets. A potential 
competitor is usually a firm able to undertake the required investments to enter the market within one year 
following a small but significant increase in prices as well as having a certain brand image and financial 
strength. For entry in electricity, ready available gas capacities have been considered an important factor.  
The most important element will be the assessment of the cumulative effect of all the LTC signed by the 
different producers on market foreclosure. Indeed, LTC can foreclose markets to new entrants only to the 
extent that a substantial part of market demand is tied for the long term. The doctrine of cumulative effect 
had been devised in a famous series of cases in the beer and ice-cream sectors and had been one of the 
cornerstones of the ‘more-economic’ approach in EC antitrust policy. As a general rule, the European 
Commission considers that a significant cumulative foreclosure effect is unlikely to arise if the total market 
demand tied in the long term does not exceed 30% of global demand. In the case of a ‘super-dominant’ 
incumbent like in the Distrigaz case, the European Commission considered that no competition concerns 
would arise if its portfolio of LTC would cover less than 20% of the market. In E.ON Ruhrgas, the 
Bundeskartellamt estimated that the firm contributed significantly to cumulative foreclosure with 75% 
market shares in its supply area, within a national market where 80% of total demand was supplied in the 
long term. This demonstrates that when a firm is largely dominant, the anti-competitive effects of its 
demand tied in the long term arise sooner. In the case of a group of leading suppliers, the European 
Commission will look similarly at the cumulative effects of their LTC but there will be no need to prove 
that they lead to tacit collusion to show that significant foreclosure effects occur (Kjolbye, 2007). 
 
B-2 Analysis of contract characteristics 
 
After having analyzed market conditions and their likely evolutions, the focus will be on the 
characteristics of both the LTC itself and the contracting parties. Most prominently, the European 
Commission will conduct a combined analysis of duration, exclusivity and whether buyers who represent 
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alone a substantial part of total market demand are tied for the long term with the dominant supplier, or the 
collectively dominant suppliers.  
The European Commission will first look at the percentage of the consumer demand tied under the LTC, 
namely the exclusivity clause, as it is one of the main sources of foreclosure effect. Indeed, if a customer 
must meet all or a big part of its needs with a particular supplier for a long period of time, he does not 
constitute any longer an available outlet for a potential entrant. In Gas Natural/Endesa in 2000, the 
Commission reduced the size of the contract from nearly 100% to 75% of Endesa global purchases as 
Endesa was one of the leading electricity producers in Spain and thus could motivate entry in gas supply in 
its own right. More generally, the European Commission is looking here at the degree of economic 
dependency of the buyer vis-à-vis the dominant supplier. The share of the customer’s demand tied is in the 
European Commission’s view the best way to demonstrate dependency and it repeatedly used that proxy. 
Most importantly, the analysis of the European Commission is based on quantities actually received and 
not on quantities contracted. Indeed, take-or-pay or flexibility clauses are one of the main reasons why 
LTC dry out spot markets. Quantities effectively used are generally not the same than quantities previously 
forecasted. Without flexibility mechanisms, buyers would be obliged to trade their surplus or source their 
missing quantities from spot markets. LTC could therefore contribute to the deepening of these markets 
while providing a fair level of supply security (Longva, 2008). However, flexibility mechanisms are not 
forbidden per se and the European Commission conducts its analysis on a case-by-case basis. 
European competition authorities recognize when they analyze the share of the customer's demand tied 
that transaction costs may become too high when negotiating for a small quantity and that it may become 
uneconomic for an alternative supplier to provide less than a certain amount. Recent decisions seem to 
indicate that it is considered that 20% of a customer demand is the threshold for having incentives to enter 
into a relationship with a second supplier (E.ON Ruhrgas and RWE). Competition authorities are thus more 
reluctant to accept LTC accounting for more than 80% of a customer demand. Some commentators close to 
the European Commission think that foreclosure effects could be found for contracts amounting as low as 
50% of a customer demand in case these contract terms are widely spread in the market (Schnichels and 
Nyssens, 2007).  
The share of the customer's demand tied has to be analyzed along with the duration of the contract. Even 
if 100% of a customer demand is tied to a particular supplier, foreclosure will not occur if this customer 
can return to the market on a regular basis. As a general rule, the European Commission is very suspicious 
of contracts longer than 5 years and considers that efficiencies generally do not offset foreclosure effects 
beyond that limit. We also note that the Commission considers contracts with tacit renewal clauses or no 
last delivery date as contracts of indefinite duration (E.ON Ruhrgas). Recent decisions show that the 
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duration of contracts accepted by the European Commission will mainly depend on the competition 
position of the counterparty. If the counterparty is an established reseller, accepted duration will probably 
not exceed two years as in Distrigaz. The Bundeskartellamt in E.ON Ruhrgas restricted duration to four 
years for contracts with resellers who have more than 50% of their demand tied under the contract, but only 
two years above 80%. European competition authorities will thus play with the two factors. Interestingly, 
where requirements are satisfied by several suppliers, the Bundeskartellamt specified that contracts should 
distribute the risk of demand fluctuations among suppliers according to the actual supply share provided by 
each of them so as not to disadvantage the second supplier. In Repsol, 5 years duration was accepted for 
exclusive contracts with established resellers but the market shares of the dominant firm only reached 30 to 
50%, which shows that the European Commission adjusts duration according to the level of market 
dominance of the supplier. For a new entrant in retail, duration of 5 years is most likely to be accepted. One 
also notices a more lenient approach of the European Commission towards fuel supply contracts than to 
electricity producer/reseller contracts. This shows that even dominant firms need and can claim for some 
degree of long term security in fuel supply. 
 
IV. BALANCING ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS WITH EFFICIENCY GAINS AND IMPOSING REMEDIES: THE 
‘MORE-ECONOMIC’ APPROACH IN EC ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE ‘PRO-ENTRY’ STRATEGY OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN ENERGY 
 
Once the European Commission has considered that a LTC, or a portfolio of LTC, is likely to create 
significant anti-competitive effects, it will analyze the potential efficiency gains and proceeds to a 
balancing exercise. In case efficiency gains do not seem to clearly offset anti-competitive effects, LTC 
might still be accepted if satisfactory remedies can be imposed. 
 
 
 
A-  LTC, efficiency gains and the practice of the balancing exercise 
 
The balancing exercise follows a methodology based on four criteria directly derived from the wording 
of the EC Treaty. In theory, for LTC with substantial anti-competitive effects to be cleared by competition 
authorities, they should (i) substantially improve economic efficiency, (ii) give a fair share of benefits to 
final consumers, (iii) be indispensable or at least proportional to the achievement of the efficiency gains 
and (iv) not afford contracting parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
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part of the products in question. Objective factors out of the control of the company such as public service 
obligations may also be taken into account. In practice, we note that it is often difficult to trace back 
elements of competition authorities’ decisions precisely to the four criteria.  
The first criterion indicates that the LTC must create significant efficiency gains to be accepted. Recent 
decisions are however less clear on how to analyze efficiency gains than on how to assess anti-competitive 
effects. The outcome of the balancing will thus be even harder to predict. The two main efficiency gains 
recognized by the European Commission have been investment and entry. In Synergen for instance, the 
Commission accepted both a 15 years gas supply contract with Statoil for 100% of the needs of a CCGT 
plant and a 15 years power purchase agreement for 50% of its output with the electricity incumbent ESB. It 
thus recognized the need of secure output levels and long-term upstream fuel commitments to facilitate 
investments and project financing. However, the mere objective of securing loans might not be sufficient to 
have a LTC accepted as the Commission in other sectors did not always consider it indispensable. In case 
the loan comes from a dominant supplier, it is likely to be considered as an efficiency gain only if it cannot 
be obtained on the same terms with commercial or investment banks. It is also noticeable that the 
Commission has once acknowledged that even dominant firms could claim for a certain level of security in 
fuel supply (Gas Natural/Endesa). The second criterion does not seem to have lead to very substantial 
developments and in general was analyzed along with the first criterion on efficiency gains. As a general 
rule, the Commission considered that LTC helping investment and entry contributed to the success of the 
liberalization process, which was in itself thought to be good for final consumers.  
The third (proportionality) and fourth (exclusion) criteria are obviously very difficult to implement and 
this is where the discretion as well as the difficulties of antitrust authorities really lie. European 
competition authorities are still struggling with them today. For instance, an open question concerns the 
duration that an incumbent electricity producer really needs to sink a very high fixed-cost investment 
(criterion 3) and how to make sure that this duration will not result in excessive exclusionary effects 
(criterion 4). A first indication was however given by the European Commission in the Exeltium case in 
September 2008. Exeltium was a consortium of energy intensive users to whom EDF was to supply base 
load electricity over more than 20 years. Alleged efficiency gains mainly included security of fuel supply 
and hedging for the buyers. The European Commission finally cleared this contract, after almost three 
years of analysis, provided that resale restrictions would be cancelled and an opt-out clause would be 
introduced to mitigate anti-competitive effects. In addition, the European Commission explicitly stated that 
the Exeltium agreement would be included in the analysis of the cumulative foreclosure effect of the 
contract portfolio of EDF currently being conducted.  
Interestingly, one of the main advantage attached to LTC recently discussed in the economic literature, 
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which is the potential mitigation effect of LTC on spot market abuses, has never been used by the European 
Commission. This probably reflects the fact that such economic analysis based on oligopoly modeling 
would not reach the legal standard of proof required before the court. 
 
B- Market building through antitrust remedies: the new treatment of incumbents 
 
In case efficiency gains do not seem to clearly offset anti-competitive effects during the balancing 
exercise, LTC might still be accepted if satisfactory remedies can be imposed.  
A first group of remedies has consisted in modifying the drafting of contracts, for instance by deleting 
certain clauses such as use restrictions or limiting duration. In this case, the whole agreement is not 
cancelled and it belongs to the parties to decide whether the contract is still valid. Other more behavioral 
remedies have been imposed such as forbidding any vertical mergers or acquisitions to a dominant 
company for a certain number of years (Repsol). These are classical remedies in EC antitrust policy and are 
not specific to the energy sector. One notes here that if long-term generation adequacy is clearly a core 
policy goal of the European Commission, the vague concept of ‘security of supply’ is itself approached 
with more and more skepticism in antitrust cases. Today, even long-term gas import contracts are not sure 
to be accepted on the basis of a ‘security of supply’ argument. 
The second group of remedies has been specifically devised for the energy sector and coincided with the 
decision of the European Commission to use its power against abuses of dominance (Art 82 EC) to attack 
directly the portfolio of LTC of the incumbents. This was thought to be the only way to bring about rapidly 
substantial improvements in the competitive structure. The European Commission recognized that some of 
these LTC created real efficiency gains (criterion 1) but that the criterion on exclusion and proportionality 
could only be fulfilled if foreclosure effects were severely mitigated. This lead the Commission to impose 
remedies better able to accommodate market players’ needs while limiting foreclosure.  
The Distrigaz decision constitutes according to the European Commission the landmark case for future 
antitrust enforcement on LTC in energy. The European Commission opened a proceeding against the 
Belgian electricity incumbent for possible breaches of the EC Treaty rules on abuse of a dominant position 
due to their long-term contracts with industrial customers. The European Commission started by excluding 
of the analysis of cumulative foreclosure effects all the LTC linked to a new investment in gas-fired power 
plants, in line with its analysis of efficiency gains. A strict limitation of 5 years was then imposed on 
remaining contracts to avoid that customers who would be particularly likely to switch suppliers be tied for 
a very long period of time and unilateral termination rights were granted to buyers with contracts longer 
than 5 years. The innovation lied in the flexibility parameters granted to the dominant firm. Distrigaz was 
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allowed to adjust its portfolio of contracts to its own needs as long as it complied with a duration of 
maximum 5 years and if 70% of its customers come back to the market every year. As a result, Distrigaz 
could indifferently have 37.5% of customers supplied under 5 year contracts and 62.5% supplied under one 
year contracts or 40% supplied under 4 year contracts and 60% supplied under one year contracts. These 
commitments were due to last for a minimum of four years and until Distrigaz’ market shares decrease 
below 40% (or another supplier reaches the level of Distrigaz market shares minus 20%).  
 
C-  Conclusion: European LTC in competition policy - the European Commission is doing good, thank 
you! 
 
The analysis of the recent series of decisions shows that the European Commission is using an economic 
approach to analyze foreclosure effects of LTC and imposing remedies in energy. Its combined analysis of 
duration, exclusivity and the pattern of consumption are particularly interesting. Even if the two-step 
methodology has not been devised for the specificities of newly deregulated energy markets, we have to 
conclude that this methodology balance favorably between the need for predictability and the need for a 
full competition analysis in complicated cases. True, the hierarchy among elements to be taken into account 
during the balancing exercise lacks of clarity and hence predictability. In addition, it is obvious that the 
analytical framework used and the remedies imposed are designed so as to be accepted by Community 
Courts in case of appeal. We can nonetheless already have a first picture of the emerging doctrine of 
European competition authorities.  
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The case of LTC is highly topical. This paper has shown that the European Commission is much less 
dogmatic than is usually thought. Its analysis displays real efforts to both include recent insights of the 
competition analysis of foreclosure and limit regulation costs through a step-based approach. Even 
dominant incumbents are granted the right to sign LTC and the remedies imposed here and there have been 
innovative. However, the European Commission still takes a ‘legalistic’ approach in so far as its practice 
closely complies with what could be acceptable before the European Courts of Justice. In addition this new 
approach has not been devised for the specific context of energy market building and there is no reason to 
believe that the thresholds successfully used for beer and ice-cream are inevitably smart for energy. The 
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market building efforts of the Commission under its antitrust powers thus appear to be constrained by the 
procedural aspects of the legal process.  
In addition, by building markets through antitrust, the Commission necessarily focuses on market 
structure rather than on market design. This is a risky choice as our knowledge of competition dynamics in 
these sectors is too limited to propose very robust and efficient remedies. We must note that building 
market through antitrust is far from being limited to the ex post tool kit. Antitrust has become a constantly 
on-going process of ‘trial-and-error’ which clarifies rules over time. Each rule being clarified increases the 
credibility of self-enforcing competitive behaviors in the market. Today we think that we are up to a point 
where the lack of predictability could be more detrimental to market building and social welfare that the 
lack of economic analysis. As a result, we would applaud the publication of non-binding guidelines on 
acceptable contract forms and reasonable nexus of contracts as a positive step forward in the building of the 
EU internal market.  
 
VI. REFERENCES 
¾ Aghion and Bolton, “Contracts as a Barrier to Entry”, 77 American Economic Review (1987), 388-401. 
¾ Albers, “Energy Liberalization and EC Competition Law”, Fordham International Law Journal (2001), 
909. 
¾ Allaz and Vila, “Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency”, 59 Journal of Economic 
Theory (1993), 1-16. 
¾ Bishop and Ridyard, “EC Vertical Restraints Guidelines: Effects-based or Per Se Policy?”, 23(1) 
European Competition Law Review (2002). 
¾ Bonasina, Creti and Manca, “Im-perfectly Competitive Contract Markets for Electricity” (2007), 
Working Paper. 
¾ Borenstein, “The Troubles with Electricity Markets: Understanding the California’s restructuring 
disaster”, 16 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2002), 191-212. 
¾ Borison and Hamm (2005). “Better Power Contracts: Using Flexibility to Increase Value”, 18(10) The 
Electricity Journal (2005), 64-69. 
¾ Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York: Free Press, 1993).  
¾ Bushnell, “Oligopoly Equilibria in Electricity Contract Markets”, 32 Journal of Regulatory Economics 
(2007), 225–245. 
¾ Chao, Oren, and Wilson, “Reevaluation of Vertical Integration and Unbundling in Restructured 
Electricity Markets” in Sioshansi (ed.), Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, and 
 
 
 19
Performance (London, Elsevier: 2001), Chapter 1, 27-65.  
¾ Crocker and Masten, “Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length, 19(3) 
RAND Journal of Economics (1988), 327-343. 
¾ DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC(2006) 1724, 10 January 2007, 232-244 and 
283-294. 
¾ Doane and Spulber, “Open Access and the Evolution of the US Spot Market for Natural Gas”, 37(2) 
Journal of Law and Economics, (1994), 477-517. 
¾ EAGCP report, “An Economic Approach to Article 82” (July 2005). 
¾ EDF-IDEI Report, Contrat de Long Terme, Concurrence et Efficacité, (December 2007). 
¾ Ehlermann, “The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: a Legal and Cultural Revolution”, 37 Common 
Market Law Review (2000), 537. 
¾ Finon and Perez, “Investment Risk Allocation in Restructured Electricity Markets: The Need of Vertical 
Arrangements” (2008), LARSEN Working Paper. 
¾ Finon and Roques, “Financing Arrangements and Industrial Organization for New Nuclear Build in 
Electricity Markets” (2008), EPRG Working Papers 0826, University of Cambridge. 
¾ Fumagalli and Motta, “Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete”, 96 American Economic 
Review (2006), 785-795. 
¾ Glachant and Hallack, “Take or Pay Contract Robustness: a Three Step Story Told by the Brazil-Bolivia 
Gas Case?”, forthcoming in Energy Policy (2008). 
¾ Glachant and Lévêque, “Electricity Internal Market in the European Union: What to do Next?” (2006), 
EPRG Working Papers 0605, University of Cambridge. To be published in Glachant and Lévêque (eds), 
Electricity Reform in Europe. Towards a Single Energy Market (London, Edward Edgar, 2009) 
forthcoming. 
¾ Green, “The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales”, XLVII(1) Journal of Industrial 
Economics (1999),  107–124. 
¾ Green and Newbery, “Competition in the Electricity Industry in England and Wales”, 13(1) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy (1997), 27-46. 
¾ Green and Le Coq, “The Length of Contracts and Collusion” (2006), CSEM Working Paper 154, 
University of California Energy Institute. 
¾ Hubbard, Glenn, and Weiner, (1986) “Regulation and Long-Term Contracting in US Natural Gas 
Markets”, 35(1) Journal of Industrial Economics (1986), 71-79. 
¾ Joskow, “Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal Burning Electric Generation 
Plants”, 1(1) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1985), 33-80. 
 
 
 20
¾ Joskow, “Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships”, 4(1) Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, (1987a), 95-177. 
¾ Joskow, “Contract Duration and Relationship-specific Investments”, 77 American Economic Review 
(1987b), 168. 
¾ Klein, Crawford and Alchian, “Vertical Integration, Appropriate Rents, and the Competitive Contracting 
Process”, 28(2) Journal of Law and Economics (1978), 297-326. 
¾ Kjolbye in Jones (ed.), EU Energy Law Volume II: EU Competition Law and Energy Markets (2nd ed., 
Claeys and Casteels, 2007). 
¾ Lacy, “Nuclear Investment: Performance and Opportunity”, Communication to World Nuclear 
Association Annual Symposium 2006. 
¾ Longva, “Long-term Contracting from the Point of View of a Big Industrial Energy Consumer” (2008), 
Communication to CESSA Conference, Florence. 
¾ Le Coq, "Long-Term Supply Contracts and Collusion in the Electricity Market" (2004), SSE/EFI 
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No 552. 
¾ Liski and Montero, “Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly”, 131(1) Journal of Economic Theory 
(2006), 212–230. 
¾ Littlechild, Beesley lecture (2005). 
¾ Mahenc and Salanié, “Softening Competition Through Forward Trading”, 116 Journal of Economic 
Theory (2004), 282–293. 
¾ Markiewicz, Rose and Wolfram, “Has Restructuring Improved Operating Efficiency at US Electricity 
Generating Plants?” (2004), CSEM Working Paper 135,  University of California Energy Institute 
¾ Masten and Crocker, “Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural 
Gas”, 75(5) American Economic Review (1985), 1093-1093. 
¾ Monti, “Applying EU Competition Law to the Newly Liberalized Energy Markets” (2003), 
Communication to the World Forum on energy regulation, Rome. 
¾ Mulherin, “Complexity in Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contract Provisions”, 2(1) 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1986), 105-117. 
¾ Newbery, “The Relationship between Regulation and Competition Policy for Network Industries” 
(2006), EPRG Working Papers 0611, University of Cambridge.  
¾ Newbery, “Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market”, 29 RAND Journal of 
Economics (1998), 726-749. 
¾ Newbery and Pollitt, “The Restructuring and Privatisation of the CEGB: Was it Worth it?” (1997), XLV 
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 269-303. 
 
 
 21
¾ Newbery, van Damme and von der Fehr, “Benelux Market Integration: Market Power Concerns” 
(2003), Report of the Market Surveillance Committee, Dutch Competition Authorities. 
¾ Neuhoff and Hirschhausen, “Long-Term vs. Short-Term Contracts: A European Perspective on Natural 
Gas” (updated version November 2006), Working Paper CWPE 0539 and EPRG 05, University of 
Cambridge. 
¾ Neuman Hirschhausen, “Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited – An Empirical Analysis 
of Producer-Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry” (2006), EPRG Working Paper 0610, 
University of Cambridge.  
¾ Neuhoff and de Vries, “Insufficient Incentives for Investment in Electricity Generations”, 12 Utilities 
Policy (2004), 253-267. 
¾ Onofri, “Electricity Market Restructuring and Energy Contracts: a Critical Note on the EU 
Commission’s NEA Decision”, 20 European Journal of Law and Economics (2005), 71-85. 
¾ Parsons, “Estimating the Strategic Value of Long-Term Forward Purchase Contracts Using Auction 
Models”, 44(4) Journal of Finance (1989), 981-1010. 
¾ Parson, “Fact & Fantasy: Risk Management in Electricity Markets” (2008), Communication to EEM 
Conference, Lisbon. 
¾ Posner, Antitrust law: An economic perspective (University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
¾ Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley, “Naked Exclusion”, 81 American Economic Review (1991), 1137-
1145. 
¾ Roques, “Technology Choices for New Entrants in Liberalized Markets: The Value of Operating 
Flexibility and Contractual Arrangements” (2007) EPRG0726 & CWPE 0759, university of Cambridge. 
¾ Roques, Newbery and Nuttal, “Investment Incentives and Electricity Market Design: the British 
Experience”, 4(2) Review of Network Economics (2005), 93-128. 
¾ Roques, Newbery, Nuttall, de Neufville and Connors, “Nuclear power: a hedge against uncertain gas 
and carbon prices?”, 27(4) The Energy Journal (2006), 1-24.  
¾ Roques, Newbery and Nuttall, “Fuel mix diversification incentives in liberalized electricity markets: A 
Mean–Variance Portfolio theory approach”, Energy Economics (2007). 
¾ Segal and Whinston, “Naked Exclusion: Comment”, 90 American Economic Review (2000), 296-309. 
¾ Schnichels and Nyssens, “Energy” in Faull and Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (OUP, 2nd ed., 
2007). 
¾ Simpson and Wickelgren, “Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition”, 
American Economic Review (2007), 1305-1320. 
¾ Smeers "How Well Can One Measure Market Power in Restructured Electricity Systems?" (2005), 
 
 
 22
Communication to SESSA Conference. To be published in Glachant and Lévêque (eds), Electricity 
Reform in Europe. Towards a Single Energy Market (London, Edward Edgar, 2009) forthcoming.  
¾ Stern, Competition and liberalisation in European Gas Markets: A diversity of models (The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London: 2008). 
¾ Stern, “UK Gas Security: Time to Get Serious”, 32(17) Energy Policy (2004), 1967-1979. 
¾ Van den Bergh, “The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law”, in 
Cucinotta, Pardolesi and Van den Bergh (eds.), Post Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law 
(Cheltenham: Elgar, 2002), 34-59. 
¾ Verouden, “Vertical Agreements and Article 81(1) EC: The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis”, 71 
Antitrust Law Journal (2003), 525. 
¾ Watson 2004, ‘Selection Environments, flexibility and the success of the gas turbine’, 33 Research 
Policy (2004): 1065-1080. 
¾ Wesseling, The Modernization of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Publishing, 2000). 
¾ Willem and de Corte, “Market Power Mitigation by Regulating Contract Portfolio Risk“, 36 Energy 
Policy (2008), 3787–3796. 
¾ Wiser, Bachrach, Bolinger and Golove, “Comparing the Risk Profiles of Renewable and Natural Gas-
fired Electricity Contracts”, 8 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews (2004), 335–363. 
¾ Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, 1975). 
¾ Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism - Firms, Market, Relational Contracting (New 
York: Free Press, 1985). 
¾ Williamson, “Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange”, 73(4) American 
EconomicReview (1983), 519-540. 
 
 
